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ORIGINALITY AND MONETARY REMEDIES
UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT ACT
MICHAEL A. MARRA*

ection, 101 (b)I of the Copyright Act--described 2 by one court as
an "ambiguous hodgepodge of improvisations" -- has given rise
to a confusing and problematic body of case law. These cases and
their commentators have invariably treated this provision of the
* B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1963; J.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, 1973. This article represented the State
University of New York at Buffalo Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence in the National
Competition, 1972 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970):
(If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the
copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable: ) To pay to
the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have
suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer
shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be required
to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages
and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in
assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as
hereinafter stated, but in case of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted
photograph, such damages shall not exceed the sum of $200 nor be less
than the sum of $50, and in the case of the infringement of an undramatized
or nondramatic work by means of motion pictures, where the infringer shall
show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages shall not exceed
the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement of a copyrighted dramatic
or dramatico-musical work by a maker of motion pictures and his agencies
for distribution thereof to exhibitors, where such infringer shows that he was
not aware that he was infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could not reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of such damages
recoverable by the copyright proprietor from such infringing maker and his
agencies for the distribution to exhibitors of such infringing motion picture
shall not exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than $250, and such damages
shall in no other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of
$250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty. But the foregoing exceptions
shall not deprive the copyright proprietor of any other remedy given him under
this law, nor shall the limitation as to the amount of recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant, either by service
of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him.
First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, $10 for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer
or his agents or employees;
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statute as creating three distinct categories of monetary remedies for
infringement: profits, damages and statutory damages. Given this
approach, it would seem only natural that each classification would
develop its own peculiar and distinct rules. Unfortunately, much of
the confusion in this area of copyright law can be traced to the ramifications necessarily attending such a categorical approach.
However, section 101 (b) and the cases decided thereunder can
be viewed as raising a single, pervasive issue which, as suggested by
this paper, is intimately tied to the notion of originality, Thus, viewing the essential function of copyright law as protecting the originality
in a copyrighted work, one might treat the originality in a work as
the intangible property of the copyright proprietor. Accordingly, an
infringer would be one who wrongfully appropriated the intangible
property of the copyright proprietor-the originality of the work.
The issue under section 101 (b), then, might be stated as "What is
the monetary value of the appropriated property?" Treated in this
manner, the typical categories of monetary remedies-profits, damages
and statutory damages-become not self-contained, distinct systems,
but rather different means by which the copyright proprietor can be
made whole.
A simple metaphor might be illustrative. Copyright law may be
likened to a reservoir in which the contents-the originality of a work
-are reserved to the copyright proprietor for a limited time. The
foundation of the reservoir is an array of rights accorded the copyright proprietor by section 1 of the Act. 4 An infringer is one who
Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title,
except a painting, statue, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy made or
sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every infringing delivery;
Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or
orchestral composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical compositions $10 for every
infringing performance.
2. Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
3. Originality, as the term is visualized and used here, means that a work "owes
its origin to the author," that is, "independently created and not copied from other
works." M. NIMIER, COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW PERTAINING TO
LITERARY, MUSICAL & ARTISTIC WORKS 17 (1971).
4. § 1. Exclusive rights as to copyrighted works
[The copyright proprietor] shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the . ..work into other languages ...or make any other
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wrongfully taps from the reservoir a portion of its contents. In order
to restore the misappropriated contents to the copyright proprietor it
becomes necessary to impute a monetary value to the "tapped-off"
portion.
How might that value be ascertained? Obviously, the question
is of an evidentiary nature. Yet section 101 (b) itself suggests some
relevant factors. Directly bearing on the monetary value of the appropriated property is evidence of actual damage and the profits earned
by the infringer in his utilization of the work's originality. Indirectly
bearing on the monetary valuation are those factors commonly relied
on by the courts in the assessment of statutory damages-intent, the
extent of dissemination of infringing material ("breadth" of infringement), and the number of infringements ("depth" of infringement).
If the cases decided under section 101 (b) are treated in an evidentiary manner, it becomes possible to reconcile many apparently
inconsistent results. Further, it also. permits the courts to fashion
remedies more closely comporting with fundamental copyright
policy than a bare reading of the statute might otherwise permit. It
will be the purpose of this paper to illustrate the application of the
evidentiary approach-under the guise of traditional section 101 (b)
language-to a selected spectrum of cases.
version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic
work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama;
to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish
it if it be a model or design for a work of art;
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted
work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production,
or other nondramatic literary work; to make or procure the making of any
transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may
in any manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced,
or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to exhibit,
represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever.
...
[A]nd
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a
drama or . . . to vend any manuscript or any record . . . thereof; to make or
to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by .. . which ...
it may . . . be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and
to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it...
; and
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition; and . . . to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody
of it in any system of notation ... from which it may be read or reproduced....
(f) To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted
work if it be a sound recording....
17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971).
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I. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Before the cases are scrutinized, some preliminary observations on
the originality-evidentiary approach are in order. It must be conceded,
that the five factors-profits, damages, intent, breadth of infringement, and depth of infringement-to be treated as evidence bearing
on the question of the value of the misappropriated property, are not
expressly authorized by the Act to be so treated.
However, with the exception of intent, the factors are taken from
the very language of section 101 (b). Intent5 has been introduced into
the remedy scheme by the courts apparently sua sponte, possibly because
the Act has no provision for punitive damages." Yet the very lack of
statutory provision as to punitive damages, in light of the obvious
import given to intent by the courts in assessing monetary remedies,7
suggests an inconsistency.
This would not be inconsistent if intent be regarded as evidence
of value.
That these pictures had their worth . . . is sufficiently shown by the
desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiff's rights.8
One might say, then, that the mere act of infringement has probative
force with respect to value. Where the infringement is willful and
deliberate-where the infringer is deliberately assuming the risk of
legal liability-the inference of value is that much stronger. The
fact that the infringement proved unprofitable to the infringer is not
significant. Absent other factors, as between the copyright proprietor
and the infringer, the risk of financial loss should fall upon the latter.
Given that intent may be used to infer value, albeit speculatively,
section 101 (b) should not be construed to preclude its consideration.
It was early recognized that the "in lieu of" clause gave the court
5. See notes 56-61 infra & accompanying text.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides the only punitive sanction in the Copyright
Act with respect to infringement. It provides, with exceptions, that one who willfully
infringes for profit shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
7. SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, SuNATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., LIABILITY OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS
OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDY No. 25, at 146 (Comm. Print 1960); Price, Monetary Remedies

under the United States Copyright Code, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (1959); Note,
Liability for Copyright Infringement-Handling Innocence in a Strict Liability Context,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 940 (1970).
8. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1902).
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considerable latitude in speculation.... I must assess the damages,
all things considered, by the best inference I can make, even when I
cannot have much basis for certainty, even when the plaintiff would
fail, were the issue tried before a jury. 9
Thus, it would seem that section 101 (b) does not, by its terms, prohibit the treatment of intent as evidence of value. A similar statement
might be made with respect to the other factors.
A second observation is that the factors are not of equal importance. Obviously, the profit factor has a much greater probative
force than any of the indirect factors. But it must also be recognized
that profits may be fundamentally deficient as a proper index in some
circumstances. Additionally, the mere existence of profits does not
totally eliminate the other factors, which must be examined in the
light of the facts of a given case.
A third observation is that some damage has occurred from the
mere act of infringement. While this observation is contrary to the
suggestion of some cases that a distinction can be made between the
situations where damage is uncertain and where it is certain there is
no damage, 10 the observation would not be contrary to section 101 (b).
The very purpose of the "in lieu of" provision is that a plaintiff should
not fail for lack of proof. 1 To assert that a plaintiff must nevertheless
prove some damage would have the net effect of compromising the
exclusive rights accorded to the copyright proprietor by section 1.12
The mere fact that the "in lieu of" provision exists and that minimum sums are specified as a part of that provision shows that Congress
regarded any infringement as damaging the copyright proprietor's
interests. In other words, section 101 (b) should be read together
9. Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916). But cf. Westermann Co.'v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100 (1919).
10. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d
236 (9th Cir. 1966); Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.

1944). " ,..

11. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207 (1935):
The phraseology of the section was adopted to avoid the strictness of construction incident to a law imposing penalties, and to give the owner of a copyright
some recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law render
difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits. In this respect
the o*ld law was unsatisfactory. In many cases plaintiffs, though proving infringement, were able to recover only nominal damages....
Id. at 209.
12. An exclusive right without an effective remedy is no right at all. E.g., Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
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with and as a function of section 1. To that extent, section 101 (b)
should be construed so as to aid in copyright protection. 3
Nor does the phrase "shall not be regarded as a penalty"' 14 militate
against the assumption that some damage has occurred by reason of
infringement. The statute does not say that the infringer "shall not
be penalized." It says that an award based on the statutory criteriai.e., the indirect factors-"shall not be regarded as a penalty."15 This
phraseology was specifically adopted to avoid the strict construction
placed upon the penalties existing before the 1909 revision."0 The
phrase is a mandate to the courts for a liberal construction of the
monetary remedies provision of the Act.
However, there still must be a rational basis for distinguishing
among infringements, given that some damage has occurred. The only
fact common to all infringements would seem to be that something
has been appropriated from the copyright proprietor. That something
is the originality of the work. It would seem to follow, then, that the
value of the appropriated property would be the proper index to distinguish between infringements for the purposes of section 101 (b). At
the very least, the evidentiary approach allows a court greater flexibility
to do this than would a stylized categorical approach.
This leads us to a fourth observation on the originality-evidentiary
approach. The value of the appropriated originality may bear no
mathematical relationship to either the degree of appropriation or the
degree of originality. Additionally the value of appropriated originality
does not necessarily correlate with the damage to a particular work.
In this day of television and motion pictures, the derivative rights of
section 117 of the Act can be of considerable financial significance. Care
must be taken in individual cases to insure that the financial effects
of infringement on a copyrighted work are distinguished from the
effect on the copyright interest. It is the latter which is sought to be
measured under section 101 (b).
A fifth observation regarding the originality-evidentiary approach
is that it would render moot the controversy as to whether the provision:
to pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright
13. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952).

14. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).

15. Id. Emphasis added.
16. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
17. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.

102

COPYRIGHT ACT REMEDIES
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all
the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringes
ment'
provides a cumulative monetary remedy, or whether it provides for
damages or profits, whichever is greater. 19
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
19. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) stated:
The provision that the copyright proprietor may have such damages as well
as the profits which the infringer shall have made is substantially the same
provision found in section 4921 of the Revised Statutes relating to remedies
for the infringement of patents. The courts have usually construed that to
mean that the owner of the patent might have one or the other, whichever
was the greater. As such a provision was found both in the trademark and
patent laws, the committee felt that it might be properly included in the copyright laws.
Id. at 15.
It is this writer's view that this provision of section 101(b) must be put in'to
historical perspective to be clearly understood. Prior to the passage of the 1909 Copyright Act, the courts sitting in equity allowed an accounting against an infringer as an
adjunct to equity jurisdiction. This was done, without statutory mandate, on purely
equitable principles. Thus, if on equitable principles an injunction was proper, the
court so ordered and usually referred the case to a master for an accounting. See, e.g.,
Hills & Co. v. Austrich, 120 F. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
However, a claim for an injunction coupled with a claim for damages or the
forfeitures then provided under the Act, almost universally resulted in a disallowance of
the monetary claim. One early example of this is Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 604 (1854). There the Supreme Court entered a perpetual injunction restraining defendants from publishing and selling plaintiff's copyrighted map, ordered
that an accounting be made, but disallowed the prayer in the complaint for the forfeitures then allowable under the copyright law. After the complainant found there
were no profits he was once again in the Supreme Court, this time asking for damages
and appearing pro se. After noting that evidence of damages was properly denied insertion in the record on appeal, the Court reluctantly held that the record disclosed no
damages, Stevens v. Gladding, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 64 (1856).
This chasm between actions at law and actions in equity was eliminated as far
as patent cases were concerned by statutory amendment. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391,
§ 6, 29 Stat. 694. The chasm, however, persisted as far as copyright was concerned.
In Chapman v. Ferry, 12 F. 693 (9th Cir. 1882), the court held that damages were
not recoverable in a court of equity for infringement of copyright, saying:
'Butjno provision is made . .. [in the copyright law].. . as in ... [patent law]
concerning cases under "the patent laws of the United States" for the
recovery of damages as well as profits in a suit in equity. The reason for this
distinction between subjects so nearly identical in their nature and origin is not
apparent, but the statute has made it and the courts must observe it.
Id. at 695-96. In a subsequent action, 18 F. 539 (C.C.D. Ore. 1883), after the plaintiff repleaded, the court awarded a perpetual injunction and ordered an accounting of
profits.
The other side of the equity-law chasm would require that, when injunctive" relief
was noi warranted, a suit brought in equity would be dismissed on the ground that an
adequate'remedy at law was available. Perhaps the only exception to the rule arose in the
courts after passage of the 1909 revision. Since the infringement occurred before'revision,
the old! law was ostensibly applied in West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176
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F. 883 (2d Cir. 1910), modifying 169 F. 853 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1090), where the district
court held that injunctive relief was barred because of Iaches and dismissed the suit
for the reason that an adequate remedy at law existed. The Second Circuit upheld the

denial of injunctive relief and the accounting, but remanded for an assessment of damages saying:
But we also think that the court can give damages in this case by way of
compensation. Because Rev. St. U.S. § 4921 . . . entitles complainants in
equity suits arising out of patents "to recover in addition to the profits to be

accounted for by the defendant the damages the complainant has sustained"
by the infringement, and there is no similar provision as to equity suits arising
out of copyrights, it is sometimes said that damages cannot be awarded in the
latter. We think this is a misunderstanding of the statute. It applies to all
patent causes without distinction and permits damages to be assessed when

equitable relief is granted in addition to profits. This should not be construed to impair the power of courts of equity to do justice by allowing the
complainant compensation in damages where equitable relief, though it might
be given, is for some satisfactory reason withheld.
Id. at 838-39.
The merits of the case, of course, belong to history. What is important for our
purposes is that, at the time of the 1909 revision there existed a broad chasm between
actions at law and in equity; although in patent cases there was statutory authorization to allow a recovery "in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant the damages the complainant has sustained .

. . ."

Act of March 3, 1897, ch.

391, § 6, 29 Stat. 694. Note, too, the use of the term "complainant" which traditionally was used to denote a party seeking relief in equity, as opposed to "plaintiff," which
implied an action at law.
One might reasonably infer, then, that Congress intended to merge the equity and
law systems as far as copyright infringement actions were concerned. It was, however,
sometimes successfully argued to the contrary. Compare Hutchinson Amusement Co. v.
Vitaphone Corp., 93 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1937) with Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp.,
95 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1938).
The interpretation, profits or damages, "whichever was the greater," then, gains
force. But here again, a rigid adherence to this rubric is likely to lead to inconsistent
Tesults or confusion, depending upon the meaning given to the terms "damages" and
"profits."
To illustrate, suppose that A manufactures a dress with a copyrighted design and
markets his product in the high-priced retail range. Suppose further that an infringer
-with a profit margin greater than A's markets a copy in the low-priced retail range.
See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964), discussed in text at notes 41-43 infra. Presumably, the very existence of low-priced
competition will cause a loss of sales to A that will not be reflected in the infringer's
-profits.
Under the rubric, the infringer's profits, at least, would be recoverable. But would
A recover expected profits on sales lost in the high-priced market and not picked up
by the infringer? Would these be damages or profits? If they are deemed "profits" they
would be recoverable. If they are deemed "damages," they could not be recovered
(assuming that they are not of sufficient quantity to counterbalance the difference
between the profit margins of the parties on sales made by the infringer) and we
have, in effect, ignored the fact that the infringement has precluded A from exploiting
the high-priced market before going into the low-priced market.
Whatever result might be reached in the above example, suppose that the same
pirate is marketing a copy of B's dress. The respective markets are the same; the only
difference between A's situation and that of B is that B's operations allow a higher profit
margin than those of the infringer. If the lost sales were "profits" in A's case, are they
now "damages" or will B fail where A did not? If, on the other hand, A failed because
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II. PROFITS

To the extent that the originality hypothesis has been thus far
analyzed, it goes without saying that one who would slavishly appropriate, word for word, a copyrighted novel will answer to the copyright proprietor for the entire profits earned. This, of course, might
not be the case. Rather, some intermingling of the pirated work with
other matter, either by way of paraphrase, editing, addition to, or a
combination of all three might be present. Nevertheless, the assumption would appear to be that whatever is appropriated (and protected
by the Act) constitutes the fundamental commercial value of the infringing work.
In Belford, Clarke & Co. v. Scribner,20 the first Supreme Court
case wherein it was expressly argued that profits should be apportioned, the Court cited as well settled:
The rule... that, although the entire copyrighted work be not copied
in an infringement, but only portions thereof, if such portions are so
intermingled with the rest of the piratical work that they cannot be
the lost sales were "damages" will B succeed or will the court deem them "profits"?
It really should not matter. Section 101(b) should be construed so as to allow full
monetary assessment of the effect of infringement upon the copyright interest.
It would seem fairly clear, however, that Congress did not intend a double recovery
by duplicate assessments. The upshot is that neither the phrase "damages . . . as well
as all the profits" nor the phrase "one or the other, whichever (is) the greater" should
be accorded bedrock status as a governing principle under section 101(b). Treating
damages and profits as evidence of the value of misappropriated originality would, however, avoid double recovery yet still permit a full measure of the effect of infringement.
The recently proposed copyright law revision tacitly recognizes this:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him
as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages.
S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 504(b) (1971). This is underscored by the Supplemental
Report on the bill:
Profits are often used as a measure of the copyright owner's damages and,
where they coincide in this way, it would be appropriate to award either damages
or profits, whichever is greater. In that situation it would be unfair to award
damages and profits "cumulatively," since in effect it would mean that the
plaintiff would be recovering the same amount twice. On the other hand,
there are cases in which the plaintiff has suffered losses not reflected in the
defendant's profits, and the defendant has enjoyed profits that are attributable
to his use of the plaintiff's work but are not considered in assessing damages.
In these cases, as section 504 of the bill provides, it would be appropriate
for damages and profits to be awarded "cumulatively" ....
Id. at 135.
20. 144 U.S. 488 (1891).
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well distinguished from it, the entire profits realized by the defendant
will be given to the plaintiff.21
This passage might suggest two considerations of handling profits as
evidence of the value of appropriated originality: (1) the degree of
appropriation is irrelevant if (2) the pirated material cannot be reasonably separated from the remainder of the infringing work.
The first consideration is, of course, readily apparent. If B should
appropriate three chapters of A's full length novel and market the
piratical work as a short story, no legitimate purpose would be served
by not awarding to the copyright proprietor full profits earned by the
infringement. The profits in this case would correlate well with the
value of the appropriated originality.
The second consideration is more troublesome. It suggests the
possibility that if pirated material can be separated from the rest of the
work, the degree to which the copyrighted work has been copied might
be relevant. But suppose, in the above hypothetical, that B added
another chapter to the short story from a book in the public domain.
How might profits be handled then?
Here again the profits earned by the infringer closely correlate
with the value of appropriated originality. To say that only that
proportion of profits is recoverable which equals the ratio of the pirated
chapters to the entire novel would do injustice to the copyright proprietor. For example, if by the insertion of additional public domain
material, the piratical novel was thirty chapters in length, a recovery
of ten per cent of the profits would allow the infringer to enrich himself merely by adding public domain material. To allow such a result
would be, in effect, to reserve the fruits of unoriginal material to an
infringer within the framework of the copyright law. 22 The example
is even clearer when the public domain material is interspersed
throughout the pirated matter.
21. Id. at 508.
22. Of course, the same might be said with respect to awarding all the profits
earned by an infringing work compromising both pirated and public domain material
to the copyright owner. But somebody is to receive those profits which can be deemed,
in the commercial sense, to be a result of the public domain material. As between the
copyright owner and an infringer, it would more closely fit copyright policy to favor
the owner. Cf. Neal v. Thomas Organ Co., 241 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Cal. 1965). In this
respect, the proposed revision of the copyright laws regarding "profits . . . that are attributable to the infringement" can only serve to introduce more confusion into an
already troublesome area.
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One might say, then, that Scribner does not foreclose apportionment of profits between the copyright proprietor and the infringer.
On the other hand, it is not enough to say that the pirated material
can be "well distinguished" from the "rest of the piratical work." It
matters just what that remainder might be.
Let us draw upon our A/B hypothetical. Suppose that one of the
chapters had been taken from the public domain by A. Suppose
further that B composed eight new and original chapters and added
them to the piratical work-l chapters in all, two being original with
A, one in the public domain, and eight being original with B. Here
we have an entirely different situation with respect to apportionment
of profits. Essentially, this hypothetical is the case of Sheldon v. Metro23
Goldwyn Pictures Corp.
There, the plaintiff's play was found to have been infringed upon
by the defendants' motion picture. The district court affirmed, with
only slight modification, the report of the master awarding the plaintiff
the entire profits of the movie.24 The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that there should have been an apportionment of profits and fixing
25
20 percent as the proper share to be awarded the plaintiff.
In affirming, the Supreme Court distinguished between the property belonging to each party.20 The Court intuitively recognized that
the infringing work was a composite of the talents of both parties. The
Court found
[t]he controlling fact in the determination of the apportionment
was that the profits had been derived, not from the mere performance
of a copyrighted play, but from the exhibition of a motion picture
which had its distinctive profit-making features, apart from the use
of any infringing material, by reason of the expert and creative operations involved in its production and direction. 27
Also, the Court noted that
[i]n addition to the drawing power of the "motion picture stars"
other factors in creating the profits were found in the artistic conceptions and in the expert supervision and direction of the various
23. 309 U.S. 390 (1940).

24. 26 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
25. 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939).
26. 309 U.S. at 404, quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235

U.S. 641 (1914).
27. Id. at 406.
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processes which made
possible the composite result with its attractive28
ness to the public.
This language is clearly suggestive of apportionment as being

based on the respective original contributions of the copyright proprietor and the infringer subsisting in the infringing work. It is
essentially the function of copyright law to preserve for the benefit
of the copyright proprietor the originality of a work. In Sheldon, the
infringing work presented not only the originality of the copyright
proprietor, but also the independent originality of the infringers. By
awarding full profits, the court would, in effect, be appropriating for
the benefit of the copyright proprietor the independent originality of
the infringer.
This analysis is underscored by Judge Learned Hand's opinion
for the Second Circuit.
[A]ll the witnesses' estimates were based upon the contribution of the
entire play; that is, as though it was completely the work of the
plaintiffs. As we know, that was not the case; the plaintiffs worked
over old material; the general skeleton was already in the public
demesne ....

Nobody can say how far this basic plot is to be credited

with whatever the play contributed to the drawing power of the
picture. That consideration must therefore count towards reducing
the percentage of the profits recoverable. On the other hand, the defendants may not count the effect of their standing and reputation
in the industry; probably the most important factor of all, after the
29
stars.
If the absence of originality in the basic plot militates against
the copyright proprietor even though the plot may have contributed
to the drawing power of the picture and the standing and reputation
of the film maker, admittedly an important factor in the drawing
power, does not militate against the copyright proprietor, the implication is that the characteristic quality for apportioning profits is the
respective parties' original contributions present in the work.
Referring to the discussion of Scribner and the hypotheticals
posed there,3 0 if the absence of originality militates against the copyright proprietor in the face of infringer's originality, so too would the
lack of infringer's originality militate against him. Thus, where the
28. Id. at 407.
29. 106 F.2d at 50.
30. See text at notes 20-22 supra.
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infringer merely added matter from the public domain, a case warranting apportionment of profits is not presented even if the material
could be well distinguished.
In Sheldon the relative value of the parties' contributions was
assessed by use of expert testimony. In Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co.,31
where the infringing matter in a law publication dealing with condemnation was confined to the section on valuation, the court on its
own motion, apportioned a percentage. Confident, perhaps, of its own
expertise in assessing the relative values of the material the court said:
Since valuation is the single most important issue in the bulk of condemnation litigation, we feel that it is reasonable to allocate 50% of
the profits to the infringing material, although that makes up but
approximately 35% of the complete work. We think the practitioner
in this field would find the balance of the work needed and useful
in approximately the same degree as the single most important por32
tion, that on the valuation derived from Orgel.

There are other cases, however, purportedly decided under the
framework of statutory damages which can be viewed as an apportionment of profits. The clearest example of such a case is the Second
Circuit's decision in American Visuals Corp. v. Holland.3 3 There, the
plaintiff's former employee had taken plaintiff's copyrighted booklet
to an artist after leaving the plaintiff's employ. The booklet was prepared for insurance companies and depicted, in cartoon form, the
more common types of automobile accidents. In collaboration with
the artists, the former employee prepared an infringing booklet which
he marketed in competition with his former employer. It is quite clear
that the court regarded the "defendants' product [as] superior in art
work and composition" 34 and "more attractive and more saleable." 35
In the face of admitted profits of at least $7195, the Second Circuit
affirmed an award of $5000.
This result would seem dearly contrary to the express language
of the statute and the usually stated rule concerning profits. Yet the
31. 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962).
32. 301 F.2d at 122. Accord, Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465
(D.C. Cir. 1944); Stonesifer v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 48 F. Supp. 196

(S.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944).

33. 261 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181
F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
34. 261 F.2d at 654.
35. Id. at 655.
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Second Circuit thought that the district court was well within its
discretion on the basis of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. ContemporaryArts. 0
There is no reason why a court should not determine the percentage
of apportionment without resort to expert testimony as to the relative
values of the parties' contributions, provided that the court does not
exceed the limitations of its discretion.
It must also be recognized that just as the profits earned by an
infringer may exceed the value of the appropriated intangible property
of the copyright proprietor in apportionment cases, so too, may proven
profits undervalue originality. Within this latter area of administration
of monetary remedies under the Act confusion reaches its height. One
reason for the confusion is that courts insist on treating profits and
damages as ends to be sought in and of themselves rather than as
means by which an intangible property can be valued. This leads to
analytical difficulties when a court is faced with factual circumstances
in which the traditional approach breaks down. In these circumstances,
section 101 (b) is occasionally given an ad hoc construction in order
3
to justify the decision.
These aberrant rules of construction under section 101 (b) can
be obviated, however, by an evidentiary approach. If it is recognized
that when utilizing this approach the appropriated property may be
of substantially higher value in the copyright proprietor's hands than
in those of the infringer, the leading cases become fairly simple to
analyze.
Thus, for example, a highly merchantable copyrighted art work
could generate little in the way of profits to an infringer while totally
destroying the saleability of the copyright proprietor's product.
This, with some exaggeration, is what happened in the Woolworth
case. There, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of $5000, despite
admitted profits of only $900, for infringement of a statuette. The
amount of profits was the only certain figure under the facts.
As to . . . damages suffered by the copyright proprietor, the record
is inadequate to establish an actually sustained amount. Enough
appears to indicate that real and substantial injury was inflicted.
. . . There was evidence that the cheaper infringing statuette was
36. 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
37. See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S.
Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).
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inferior in quality. Respondent proved loss of some customers and
offered, but was not allowed to show complaints from sales outlets
about the Woolworth competition, decline in respondent's sales, and
eventual abandonment of the line with an unsaleable stock on hand 3 8
The Court expressly acknowledged that "sales at a small margin
might cause more damage to the copyright proprietor than would
sales of the infringing article at a higher price." 39
The clear suggestion here is that the copyright interest is considerably more valuable than indicated by the profits earned by the
infringer. Given that, certainty as to the amount of profits earned
should not deprive a court of all discretion in assessing a compensatory award, so long as the court stays within the permissible scope of
its discretion when it departs from the certain figure. That rationale
is simple enough on its face.
In Woolworth, however, the Court did not explicitly state whether
it was totally disregarding profits or merely augmenting the profits by
exercising a degree of discretion. That is to say, the Court's total disregard of the profits earned by the defendant would be consonant with
the philosophy that section 101 (b) provides separate and distinct
categories of remedies. The Court in Woolworth, then, might be said
to have vested in the trial court not only discretion as to the amount
of an award under the statutory damages methodology, but also discretion in choosing which category of remedies is to be applied. 40 This
is the more conventional reading of Woolworth.
On the other hand, under the evidentiary approach, the profits are
not disregarded. The profits are merely supplemented by an amount,
within the discretion of the trial court, sufficient to restore to the
copyright proprietor the full value of his appropriated originality.
Again, this is done because profits are only partly indicative of the
value. Had an actually sustained amount of damage in excess of profits
been proved in court, this amount would have been utilized. Absent
proof of such amount, but in light of proof that there should be an
award greater than the amount of profits, the court may estimate the

excess.
38. 344 U.S. at 230.
39. Id. at 232.
40. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236
(9th Cir. 1966); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1964); American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 261 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1958).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

That this latter reading of Woolworth is the more acceptable one
can be made abundantly clear by hypothetically taking the same facts
and scaling up the operations of the parties tenfold. Now the infringer's admitted profits are in the vicinity of $9000 and the damages
suffered by the copyright proprietor have increased similarly. Again,
the damages to the copyright interest are in excess of admitted profits.
Here, the same compelling reasons exist for an award greater than the
infringer's profits. However, such an award would not be possible
under the traditional reading of Woolworth. In contrast, the evidentiary approach will permit an estimate (not exceeding $5000) of
the damage in excess of established profits.
Essentially, the above hypothetical is the case of PeterPan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc.41 There, the infringer and the copyright
proprietor "sold fabric of different quality at different prices in what
appeared to be a different market." Evidently, the infringer catered
to the bargain basement market while the copyright proprietor
marketed his fabric in the expensive dress area. The infringer's profits
were found to be $6,464.09. The copyright proprietor's profit margin,
on the other hand, exceeded that of the infringer. Had he sold the
same quantity of fabric as was sold by the infringer, he would have
earned $8,683.65.
The special master had calculated an award totalling the two
figures. The district court rejected the Master's recommendation in
so far as it included the $8,683.65 computation on the basis that there
was no evidence justifying an award of damages. 42 The Second Circuit
rejected both views and held
that it was error for the Trial Court not to consider as within its discretion the propriety of a statutory award, if any, for damages suffered
even though incapable of exact proof in addition
to the actual
43
profits shown to have been made by the infringer.
On the facts of Jobela Fabrics,had the exclusive rights of the copyright proprietor been respected, and the popularity of the design of
the plaintiff so warranted, the design could have been exploited in the
higher priced market and then in that of the bargain basement variety.
This is the "exclusive" half of the exclusive rights to copy and vend.
41. 329 F.2d 194 (2d
42. Id. at 195.
43. Id. at 197.

-ir.1964).
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In that sense, an infringing work in a market different from, but related to, that of the copyrighted work, is more injurious to the copyright proprietor than an infringing work in precisely the same market,
when the infringer's profits are used as a reference point.
An infringing work in precisely the same market as that of the
copyrighted work excludes the copyright proprietor from a portion of
only that market. The success of the infringing work (profits or amount
sold if the infringer sells at a narrower margin than the copyright
proprietor) is a good measure of the degree of injury to the copyright
owner (the value of his appropriated intangible property).
On the other hand, where the infringer markets his copy in a
market that contains both different and overlapping portions in comparison to the proprietor's market, he excludes the copyright owner
not only from the overlapping portion but also from the diverse portion. Thus, in Jobela Fabrics, it would appear that the infringement
in the bargain basement market would affect the plaintiff in two ways.
First, it would detract from his sales by drawing purchasers to the infringing work. Second, it would force those purchasers who do not deal
in the market of the infringing work to abandon the copyrighted work
as a product line merely because of the existence of competition from
the infringing work.
While the profits earned by an infringer may adequately measure
the first effect, it will not, of course, gauge the latter. Thus, the market
structure in Jobela Fabrics precluded profits from measuring the full
value of the copyright interest. The salient factor in Jobela Fabrics,
as in Woolworth, is that an award greater than the infringer's profits
was warranted. Given that a greater award is warranted, lack of proof
as to the precise amount should not totally deprive a court of discretion. The amount of profits, in this sense, indicates that the value of
the copyright interest is at least such amount. Merely because that
amount exceeds $5000, a court should not be precluded, as a matter
of law, from attempting to reach a figure which adequately compensates the copyright proprietor. The court's discretion here is merely
based upon a certain amount; and the award is not, in the conceptual
sense, cumulative.
As suggested by the foregoing analysis, an award of an amount
greater than the infringer's profits would not be warranted when,
under the facts of the case, it can be said that the profits adequately
measure the value of the originality.
113
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In this respect, Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman CO. 44
is incorrectly decided and is a good example of the unduly harsh results
that can flow from constructions of section 101 (b) under the tradi45
tional categorical approach.
There, the plaintiff and the infringer sold to the very same buyer.
There were no other markets affected by the infringement. Whatever
sales the defendant made, the plaintiff lost. There simply were not
any facts in the case which would support a notion that the value of
the appropriated property exceeded the profits earned by the infringer.
Nevertheless, perhaps out of concern for the conspiratorial nature
of the infringement, the court awarded both profits earned by the
infringer and damages suffered on the loss of sales without regard to
duplicity.
[D]efendant's argument is not frivolous and finds support in a portion
of the legislative history. However, in [Jobela Fabrics] we squarely
faced the issue and thoroughly canvassed the authorities. In accepting the harsher "cumulative" rule, we specifically relied on the
rationale that it is "designed to discourage wrongful conduct," quoting
that language from [Woolworth] ....

Of course, whether the rule

is, or can be too harsh, as defendant asserts is arguable; when the
same customer is involved, as here, in both plaintiff's lost sales and
defendant's infringing sales, objection to the rule is at its strongest.
But the Congress is not unaware of the problem, since proposals to
modify this aspect of the statute have been pending there for some
time ....

Since our examination of the rule has been so recent, we

46
decline to reconsider it and will continue to abide by it.

Just as profits may only partly measure the value of the appropriated property by infringement, so may they bear only a remote
relationship to value. The commonest example of such a situation
is where the originality is not itself the object of the commercial exploitation but is utilized to promote the saleability of another product
47
-the case of copyrighted catalogs and labels.
No case has been found where a court has fully accepted profits
44. 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971).
45. See also Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
46. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 413-14 (2d
Cir. 1970).
47. See, e.g., Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 1400 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Burndy Engineering Co. v. Penn-Union Electric Corp., 32 F. Supp. 671
(W.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 122 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1941); Sebring Pottery Co.
v. Steubenville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Ohio 1934).
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as a proper measure of liability in such cases. The award is usually a
function of statutory damages methodology. Absent proof of a direct
relationship between profits and the copyrighted material this would
clearly seem to be proper.
On the other hand, it should also be recognized that a catalog or
label can affect the sales of an object, as the plaintiff in Fedtro, Inc. v.
Fravex Manufacturing Corp. sought to establish. 48 There, both parties
were manufacturing and selling squeeze pumps mounted on cards that
depicted usages of the pump. Plaintiff's card was copyrighted and the
defendant sold between 370,000 and 400,000 pumps mounted on infringing cards.
The court noted at the outset that
[t]he instructions and pictures on plaintiff's card which the defendant
so slavishly copied did not in their unique aspect have anything in
particular to do with the intrinsic saleability of the article or with the
49
actual sales of the article.
Nevertheless, the court did recognize that "impulse buying" was
a factor in the parties' marketing programs:
The infringing card is not a product sold to the consumer as such,
but it is something that functions, to use an expression employed
by more than one witness in the case, as a "silent salesman" of the
product. The card is not the only sales stimulant, for the product
must to some extent sell itself.50
The court then went on to treat the profits made as if from the
sale of two products-the pump and the card-allocating profits per
unit in a manner that was a compromise between the suggestions of
the parties. One aspect of this methodology was to relate the liability
imposed on the infringer directly to the success of the infringer's
product. The extent that Fedtro may alter the more traditional approach to cases of this type remains to be seen.
III. DAMAGES
After examining the manner in which courts handle profits earned
by the infringer, a review of the cases dealing with damages is almost
48. 313 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. Id. at 992.
50. Id. at 997-98.
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anticlimactic. In this area of copyright law there is very little in the
way of the subtle variations encountered in the profits area. Underscoring the relative blandness of the damages area is the fact that an
award based on actual damages-as that term is conventionally usedis relatively infrequent. The usually stated measure is the diminution
of the capital value of the copyright. 1 This measure is, for all practical purposes, synonymous with the value of the appropriated property.
One critical point that must be understood in this area is that
the damages awardable are damages to the copyright interest, not to
the copyrighted work. Courts which failed to consider this distinction
have either felt that it was unimportant or tacitly assumed in the
particular case that there was no value to the copyright interest apart
from the work in question.52 The reason for the distinction should
be quite obvious. The derivative rights of section 1 have grown considerably in financial importance along with the growth in the variety
of media.
This distinction, however, can work to the disadvantage, as well
as to the advantage, of the copyright owner. Thus, in County of
Ventura v. Blackburn,53 the damage award was vacated on the ground
that it failed to take into account a license agreement which permitted
the licensee to vend the copyrighted map. On the other hand, in
Runge v. Lee, 54 a jury verdict of $80,000 in damages was upheld even
though the plaintiff's book was out of print.5 5
51. See Price, supra note 7; Note, Monetary Recovery for Copyright Infringement, 67 HARv.L. REv.1044 (1954).
52. See, e.g., Pickford Corp. v. De Luxe Laboratories, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118
(S.D. Cal. 1958).
53. 362 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1966).
54. 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971). See also Universal
Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
55. The only noteworthy item, arising out of the cases in this area of section
101(b) is Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari in Runge v. Lee.
There, Justice Douglas argued vigorously that a standard of novelty is applicable to
copyright law as well as to patent law as a constitutional matter.
An author's "Writing" or an inventor's "Discovery" can, in the constitutional
sense, only extend to that which is his own. It may not be broadened to include
matters within the public domain. The congressional power to grant monopolies
for "Writings and Discoveries" is likewise limited to that which accomplishes
the stated purpose of promoting "the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts." No distinction is made in the constitutional language between copyrights and patents and I would not create one by judicial gloss. Where, as
here, a writer has published a book which compiles and applies information
available to all men, should that writer have a monopoly on the ideas in that
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A. Intent, Breadth of Infringement, and Depth of Infringement
Like its handling of damages, the courts' treatment of these factors
is quite mechanical as opposed to that accorded profits. Necessarily,
these factors are involved intimately with the acts of infringement as
opposed to the consequences of those acts. They operate through the
statutory damages methodology.
Obviously, the primary factors-profits and damages-are of
overriding significance in assessing the value of the appropriated
originality. But, as indicated above, these primary factors may be
deficient as a proper measure in any given case. In contrast, a characterization can be made as to "breadth" and "depth" of infringement
in every case. The assumption is dear: the greater the infringing
material has been disseminated, or the greater the number of infringements, the greater the value of the intangible property.
As among these three factors, intent (whether the infringement
was willful and deliberate) is of the greatest significance. 56 There is
some justification for this. An infringer's deliberately taking the risk
of liability can be more probative of the value of the pirated material
than the number of piratical copies produced. In any event, if a court
concluded that the infringement was willful and deliberate, an award
at or near the maximum statutory amount is probable, 57 though at
least one case has absolved from liability an infringer who was unaware
of the plaintiff's copyright and of his own infringement.5 8
Where the evidence is neutral as to the innocence of the infringer,
the court's assessment falls along the two axes of breadth and depth.
Breadth-the extent to which the infringing material has been

book through a copyright issued merely because the words were the author's
own?
Runge v. Lee, 404 U.S. 857, 890-91 (1971). It would seem, however, that even if the
ideas (as opposed to the expression of those ideas) contained in the book involved in
Runge were novel, they would not be protected by copyright law. Copyright protects
expression, not the idea; and one must distinguish between the ideas themselves and the
patterning of those ideas.
56. See Price, supranote 7; Note, supra note 7.
57. See Alouf v. Expansion Products, Inc., 417 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1969); Key
West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Fla. 1966), aff'd

per curiam, 381 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967); Baccaro v. Pisa, 252 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Manpower, Inc. v. Temporary Help of Harrisburg, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 788

(E.D. Pa. 1965).
58. Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd fier curiam, 216
F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954).
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disseminated-stems from the statutory yardstick. Depth operates
through the finding of several successive infringements-usually with
the court applying a minimum award for each infringement. It would
seem fairly clear that "depth" is more a function of time than of
separately identifiable infringements.6 0 Perhaps the only singularly
apparent principle to which the courts adhere is an amazing ingenuity
to preserve flexibility in the face of the prescribed maximum and
minimum amounts.61
CONCLUSION

If, under section 101 (b) of the Copyright Act, profits, damages
and statutory damages are not regarded as distinct, self-contained categories of monetary remedies, but rather as evidentiary means by which
the intangible property of a copyright proprietor appropriated by an
infringer can be valued, it becomes possible to reconcile many seemingly inconsistent decisions. Further, by utilizing an evidentiary approach, much of the confusion surrounding the administration of monetary remedies under the Copyright Act can be obviated. Moreover, the
flexibility attending such an approach provides the courts with the
flexibility necessary to fashion a remedy that closely accords with funcdamental copyright policy.
59. Compare Burndy Engineering Co. v. Sheldon Service Corp., 127 F.2d 661
(2d Cir. 1942) with Wells v. American Bureau of Engineering, Inc., 285 F. 371 (7th
Cir. 1922) and Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.
Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
60. See M. NIMiMER, supra note 3, at 434.
61. See Davis v. E.. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (where the authorities are extensively canvassed).

